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CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICE

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Chief Executive Officer

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April 17, 2008

To: Supervisor Yvonne B. Burke, Chair
        Supervisor Gloria Molina
        Supervisor Zev Yaroslavsky
        Supervisor Don Knabe
        Supervisor Michael D. Antonovich

From: William T Fujioka
        Chief Executive Officer

ASSESSMENT OF THE RESPONSE TO THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY OCTOBER 2007 FIRES

On October 30, 2007, the Board instructed the Chief Executive Office (CEO) to:

1)   Draft 5-signature letters of commendation to all of the involved departments/ agencies; and

2)   Report back to the Board with an assessment of the response to the recent fires, including streamlining and centralizing the dissemination of the incident reports/updates and any other specific lessons learned from this incident that will assist the County in achieving an even higher degree of preparedness in the future.

Summary of County's Response

Beginning on October 20, 2007, the County responded to four Santa Ana wind-driven brushfires and also supported neighboring counties with additional destructive fires. The Los Angeles County fires included the Ranch Fire near Castaic, the Canyon Fire in Malibu, the Buckweed Fire near Agua Dulce, and the Magic Fire at Stevenson Ranch.

The following County departments responded either directly to the fire scenes and/or sent representatives to the County Emergency Operations Center (CEOC): CEO, Fire, Sheriff, Health, Public Health, Public Social Services, Mental Health, Public Works, Coroner, Internal Services, Probation, and Animal Care and Control.

"To Enrich Lives Through Effective And Caring Service"

Fire and Sheriff Departments worked with mutual aid assets to battle the fires and evacuate victims from danger areas. This event led to multiple Local Emergency Proclamations, a State of Emergency Proclamation, and a Presidential Major Disaster Declaration.

The initial emergency management response was handled by duty officers from the Office of Emergency Management (OEM) and the Sheriff Department's Emergency Operations Bureau (EOB). Operations then transitioned to the CEOC which was activated at 12:45 p.m. on Sunday, October 21, 2007. The CEOC activation focused on overall coordination of the event and support for the affected local jurisdictions. The CEOC operated at various levels of activation from Sunday, October 21, until Monday, October, 29, 2007.

The County began recovery activities by collecting initial damage estimates for County infrastructures (totaling $2,245,000) and opening three Local Assistance Centers (LAC) following the response phase of this event. The LACs were located in Malibu, Castaic, and Santa Clarita. Numerous County departments, such as the Assessor's Office, Public Social Services, Mental Health, Public Works, Public Health, Consumer Affairs, Community and Senior Services, and Fire were represented at these centers. The departments worked with State and Federal agencies to provide a "one-stop shop" for fire victims to move forward with the recovery process.

The following is a brief summary and assessment of County departments' response to the fires. Please refer to individual departments for more detailed reports about their specific response activities.

Sheriff Department (Sheriff)

Sheriff activated four Incident Management Teams and deployed more than 2,000 sworn members over the course of four days. Mutual aid was used from Disaster Management Areas B, D, G, and H, as well as 40 California Highway Patrol officers from the Bakersfield area. Missions were handled appropriately with 24-hour-a-day support from the Department's Operations Center (DOC).

While commitment and training are still issues for the DOC, the Department's EOB, although stretched thin, managed the incident in a professional manner.

Department of Coroner (Coroner)

Coroner personnel responded to the CEOC early in the event. As the event progressed with no fatalities reported, Coroner personnel remotely monitored the event away from the CEOC via the County's Emergency Management Information System (EMIS) and remained available for immediate response.

Department of Health Services (DHS)

DHS' Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Agency actively monitored and reacted to medical and resource requests. They regularly polled local hospitals for bed availability and staffed the Health Branch in the CEOC.

Additionally, as the Regional Disaster Medical and Health Coordinator, the EMS Agency worked with Region I counties and the impacted counties in Region VI. EMS coordinated with the private sector to send two Ambulance Strike Teams, comprised of 10 ambulances with 2 supervisors, to support the San Diego Operational Area.

Department of Public Health (DPH)

DPH issued health advisories related to the possible medical impacts due to the large amount of smoke generated by the fires and potential contamination of ocean water off of Malibu. DPH provided personnel to staff the Health Branch of the CEOC and public health nurses for two of the evacuation shelters during the activation. Also, personnel responded to the three LACs immediately following the fires.

Environment Health personnel inspected fire base camps, including mobile kitchen units, and small water systems in Santa Clarita Valley and Malibu areas on a daily basis.

Department of Mental Health (DMH)

DMH sent personnel to the CEOC during the activation period and responded to requests in the Operational Area. DMH counselors were also stationed at the evacuation shelters in Malibu and Santa Clarita to support the Department of Public Social Services and American Red Cross activities. DMH personnel also responded to the three LACs immediately following the fires.

Department of Public Social Services (DPSS)

DPSS personnel worked at the CEOC during all shifts of the activation and staffed the three LACs immediately following the fires. DPSS assisted the American Red Cross in coordinating shelter for over 350 fire evacuees (including 90 developmentally disabled victims).

Department of Animal Care and Control (ACC)

ACC evacuated animals displaced by the wildfires within the jurisdictions of both the Castaic and Agoura Animal Care and Control Centers. The Castaic Center assisted in the care and housing of 114 domesticated animals. The Agoura Center assisted in the care and housing of 77 domesticated animals. Pierce College and the Antelope Valley Fairgrounds were the two locations set-up for the care and housing of horses. There were a total of 158 animals housed at Pierce College. At the Antelope Valley Fairgrounds there were a total of 49 animals housed.

All of the sheltering sites were near capacity and plans were being made for the possible addition of 500 more small animals and 200-400 more horses. Staffing was stretched to the limits, but coverage remained adequate. Several animal control organizations offered their assistance if needed. Response was both efficient and well organized considering the competing demand of two large fires in two different jurisdictions.

Department of Public Works (DPW)

DPW staffed the Construction and Engineering Branch of the Operations Section in the CEOC as needed during activation. In the field, DPW provided assistance to Fire as requested.

The fires destroyed a wooden structure bridge in the north County which resulted in the closure of Vasquez Canyon Road. DPW utilized its backup Bailey bridge to quickly provide an interim solution to reopen Vasquez Canyon Road. DPW is in the process of engineering a permanent solution. In the event of another unforeseen disaster where a bridge is lost, DPW has identified vendors who may provide temporary bridges.

During the recovery phase, DPW participated in staffing all three LACs. Among the services offered were assistance with building permits (for unincorporated area residents), information on protecting property from post-fire mudflows and flood, debris and erosion control, and sandbag distribution. A public information officer was available to respond to requests from the media covering the centers. DPW conducted safety assessments of properties within the fire zone. They worked with the residents who lost their homes and/or accessory structures to familiarize them with the reconstruction process. DPW is also coordinating with the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) in identifying locations for installation of community-scale post-fire mudflow protection structures.

DPW has prepared Burn Reports for the Buckweed, Canyon, Magic, and Ranch fires. The Burn Reports contain burn area and mudflow phase maps and descriptions of the potential mudflow impacts to facilities in the burn areas. The Burn Reports are posted online and the fires areas are included in the mudflow forecasts DPW issues to emergency response entities prior and during storms.

DPW is participating in the Burned Area Emergency Response teams that have been established for the Buckweed, Canyon, and Ranch fires to identify and implement appropriate post-fire measures. These teams include personnel from the County Fire Department, the Cities of Malibu and Santa Clarita, Cal Fire, U.S. Forest Service, NRCS, National Park Service, the State Parks Service, and the California Geological Survey. DPW is also participating in the Multi-Agency Support Group (MASG) that the Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Office of Emergency Services have established for the Southern California fires in the wake of the Federal and State Disaster Declarations for the fires. The MASG consists of many entities, including Federal and State environmental, geographical, and weather resource agencies, State Department of Health Services, and the fire area counties.

Probation Department (Probation)

Probation evacuated a total of 405 minors from the following camps during the fires: Gonzalez, Scott, Scutter, Mendenhall, and Munz. They also activated their EOC and maintained regular communications with the CEOC through EMIS during the event.

CEO/Office of Emergency Management (OEM)

OEM personnel filled lead positions at the CEOC in the Management, Planning and Intelligence, and Finance/Admin/Recovery Sections. OEM personnel also coordinated the LAC recovery operations and provided on-site management and logistical support.

As a result of this and other recent events, OEM conducted an internal analysis to assess their ability to ensure the County is able to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disasters. OEM will explore various options with the CEO to adjust staffing levels to provide an improved level of emergency preparedness in future emergency situations.

County Emergency Operations Center (CEOC)

The overall CEOC activation for the fires worked well. The CEOC was able to produce regular Situation Reports, Action Plans, and other reports for all shifts and kept County executives updated on the progress of the event. All CEOC staff worked well during 12-hour shifts providing 24-hour coverage during the emergency.

Each Supervisor
April 17, 2008
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Communications in general was the primary challenge faced by the CEOC. Although EMIS, which is the primary link between the CEOC and cities, operated effectively throughout the activation, it was clear a more robust system is needed to combine all the reporting and communication needs associated with a disaster of this magnitude. Other CEOC systems were utilized to work around the limitations of EMIS, but ideally all functions such as e-mailing, situation report and action plan writing, mapping, etc. should be housed in one system.

CEOC communications with the affected areas, especially Malibu, was difficult during this event. Regular hard-line, cell phone, and internet communications were difficult in some locations, and at times ham radio communications were the only reliable means of communication between the field and the CEOC. OEM is currently in the process of obtaining funding from the 2007 Homeland Security Grant to purchase Countywide Integrated Radio System radios to help address this issue. The Internal Services Department is working with OEM to identify a vendor to expedite the purchase once funds are available.

OEM and the Emergency Management Council (EMC) subcommittee have developed a detailed After Action Report on the CEOC activation for this event. This report was submitted to the EMC for review at their February 2008 meeting (attached).

Also submitted for your approval are examples of the 5-signature letter of commendation for all of the involved departments/agencies.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Administrator Michael Brooks, OEM, at (323) 980-2261 or Mr. Keith Harrison, OEM, at (323) 980-2269.

WTF:SRH:RDC
MJB:KH:IW:lbm

Attachments

Name
Title
United States Forest Service
Address

Dear

We would like to commend the efforts of the U.S. Forest Service in protecting the public by aggressively fighting the brushfires that burned in Los Angeles County starting on October 21, 2007.

The remarkable response and recovery efforts that held the spread of these fires and limited loss of life and property were the result of your Department's collaborative efforts with various agencies.

We extend our sincerest gratitude for responding immediately and diligently to the demands of this emergency, and for you and your staff's continued commitment in maintaining public comfort and safety.

Very truly yours,

YVONNE B. BURKE
CHAIR
SUPERVISOR, 2ND DISTRICT

GLORIA MOLINA
SUPERVISOR, 1ST DISTRICT

ZEV YAROSLAVSKY
SUPERVISOR, 3RD DISTRICT

DON KNABE
SUPERVISOR, 4TH DISTRICT

MICHAEL D. ANTONOVICH
SUPERVISOR, 5TH DISTRICT

Name
Title
Los Angeles County Department of Animal Care and Control
Address

Dear

We would like to commend the Department of Animal Care and Control for their efforts to protect the public by caring for and coordinating the evacuation of numerous animals that were threatened by the brushfires which burned in Los Angeles County starting on October 21, 2007.

The remarkable response and recovery efforts of protecting these animals and limiting loss of life and property were the result of your Department's collaborative efforts with various agencies.

We extend our sincerest gratitude for responding immediately and diligently to the demands of this emergency, and for you and your staff's continued commitment in maintaining public comfort and safety.

Very truly yours,

YVONNE B. BURKE
CHAIR
SUPERVISOR, 2ND DISTRICT

GLORIA MOLINA
SUPERVISOR, 1ST DISTRICT

ZEV YAROSLAVSKY
SUPERVISOR, 3RD DISTRICT

DON KNABE
SUPERVISOR, 4TH DISTRICT

MICHAEL D. ANTONOVICH
SUPERVISOR, 5TH DISTRICT

AFTER ACTION REPORT
ON THE
COUNTY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER (CEOC) ACTIVATION
FOR
LOS ANGELES COUNTY FIRE 2007 EVENT- OCTOBER 21-24, 2007

REPORT COMPLETED ON NOVEMBER 16, 2007

INTRODUCTION:

This report addresses issues observed by and reported to the County Office of Emergency Management (OEM) regarding the recent activation of the County Emergency Operations Center (CEOC) from October 21-29, 2007 in response to major brushfires in the Los Angeles County Operational Area.

EVENT NAME:

"Los Angeles County Fires 2007", included the following fire incidents:

- **Ranch Incident (Castaic)**
  - Time of Alarm- 2142 hours, 10/20/07
  - 47,240 acres burned

- **Canyon Incident (Malibu)**
  - Time of Alarm- 0455 hours, 10/21/07
  - 4500 acres burned
  - 6 Single Family Dwellings destroyed, 9 damaged
  - 2 Commercial Properties destroyed, 5 damaged
  - 700 homes evacuated, approximately 2100 people

- **Buckweed Incident (Agua Dulce)**
  - Time of Alarm- 1255 hours, 10/21/07
  - 38,356 acres burned
  - 15 residential structures destroyed, 3 damaged
  - 17 outbuildings/commercial destroyed

- **Magic Incident (Stevenson Ranch)**
  - Time of Alarm- 1417 hours, 10/22/07
  - 1500 acres burned

EVENT TYPE:

Actual Occurrence (Multiple Brushfires)

PARTICIPATING AGENCIES IN CEOC:

Management Section:
- Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD)
- Los Angeles County Office of Emergency Management (OEM)

Operations Section:

Public Safety Branch
- Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department (LASD)
- Los Angeles County Fire Department (LACoFD)
- Los Angeles County Department of Coroner

Care and Shelter Branch
- Los Angeles County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS)
- American Red Cross (ARC)

Health Branch
- Los Angeles County Department of Health Services (DHS)
- Los Angeles County Department of Public Health (DPH)
- Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health (DMH)

Construction and Engineering Branch
- Los Angeles County Department of Public Works (DPW)

Logistics Section
- Los Angeles County Internal Services Department (ISD)

Finance/Admin/Recovery Section
- Los Angeles County Office of Emergency Management

Planning and Intelligence Section
- Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department
- Los Angeles County Fire Department
- Los Angeles County Office of Emergency Management

Non-County Liaisons:
- Governor's Office of Emergency Services (OES)
- Homeland Security Advisory Committee (HSAC)- Business Executives for National Security (BENS)- stationed in Logistics Section, Procurement Branch

REPORT REVIEWED BY:
Keith Harrison, OEM Assistant Administrator

REPORT APPROVED BY:
Michael Brooks, OEM Administrator

EVENT START DATE:
- County EOC (CEOC) activated on October 21, 2007 at 1245 hours
- County Local Emergency Proclaimed on October 21, 2007
- City of Malibu EOC activated on October 21, 2007

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- City of Santa Clarita EOC activated and Local Emergency Proclaimed on October 21, 2007
- Southern Region EOC (REOC) activated on October 21, 2007

EVENT END DATE:
CEOC returned to Duty Officer status on October 24, 2007 at 0900 hours, and officially de-activated on October 29, 2007.

EVENT SUMMARY:
The initial CEOC response was handled by CEO/OEM and LASD/EOB Duty Officers, and then transitioned to a CEOC activation at 1245 hours on Sunday October 21, 2007. The activation was in support of the Cities of Malibu and Santa Clarita for brushfires in Malibu and Castaic areas. The CEOC activation focused on overall coordination for the event.

- 1000 hours 10/21/07- OEM Duty Officer Jeff Terry and OEM Assistant Administrator Keith Harrison responded to CEOC facility to better monitor and report on the developing fire situation.

- 1245 hours 10/21/07- CEOC officially activated after telephone consultation between CEO/OEM Administrator Michael Brooks and LA County Sheriff Department's Emergency Operations Bureau Captain Eric Parra. CEOC activation was a low level of staffing (modified Level 1), Law and Fire. DPSS and DMH brought in at the request of the CEOC Manager.

- 10/21/07- City of Santa Clarita proclaimed a Local Emergency

- 10/21/07- County proclaimed a Local Emergency

- 10/21/07- State proclaimed a State of Emergency

- 10/23 /07- Presidential Declaration of an Emergency

- 10/24/07- Presidential Declaration of a Major Disaster

- 10/24/07- CEOC activation level changed to Duty Officer Status with limited staffing.

- 10/29/07- CEOC officially de-activated

SEMS FUNCTIONAL EVALUATION:
The Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) and the National Incident Management System (NIMS) were followed during the activation.

TOTAL PARTICIPANTS:
143 total CEOC staff for two 12-hour shifts per day, 3 days total (10/21, 10/22, and 10/23). CEOC ran on Duty Officer status with one OEM Duty Officer from 10/24-10/29.

POSITIVE OUTCOMES:

- Situation Reports (SITREPs) and Action Plans were developed on regular basis.

- SITREPs and Action Plans were distributed to all CEOC staff, and archived.

- Internal CEOC e-mail system aided communications between Sections and Branches.

- The Logistics Section, staffed by ISD, provided facility and staff feeding support as needed during the activation.

- Private Sector and Public Sector coordination was enhanced by successfully integrating representatives of the Homeland Security Advisory Committee / Business Executives for National Security (HSAC, BENS) into the CEOC Logistics Section

- Face to face communication aided communications between Sections and Branches.

- Press releases were issued and information was placed on County website.

CHALLENGES

Recommendations are listed later in this report and are linked to their corresponding Challenges by number. For example, Recommendation I-A is in response to Challenge I-A below.

The following challenges were identified during the recent CEOC activation:

I.   Notifications

I-A:
Not all parties on the Basic Notification List (OEM e-mail list) received the original CEOC activation message. OEM used a work-around to reach everyone by breaking the Basic Notification List into sub groups and e-mailing messages to these smaller groups. Despite this, some recipients still missed messages.

I-B:
Although an Event was entered in the Emergency Management Information System (EMIS), there was no message stating officially when CEOC was activated.

I-C:
Duty Officer Reports detailing the fire response issued during the transition from Duty Officer response to CEOC activation did not report the date and time of the CEOC activation. This was not reported until the first official CEOC Situation Report (SITREP).

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I-D:

OEM's Dialogic mass notification system wasn't used to notify other emergency managers of the CEOC activation because there was no OEM staff initially available at the CEOC who was trained to use the system.

I-E:

The reported lack of communications in the Malibu area, due to the fire, severely hindered the response capabilities of local emergency managers. All land-line and cell phones in the area were inoperable, as well as television and internet services. The only reported reliable sources of communications in the Malibu area were HAM radios. This lack of communications limited the CEOC in establishing communications with the Malibu City Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

II. General Coordination in the CEOC:

II-A:

Not all of the LASD personnel were aware of their roles in the CEOC during an activation.

II-B:

Information from management meetings was not consistently shared with the Branches in the Operations Section by the Operations Section Officer in Charge (OIC).

II-C:

Although OEM has provided training and aids on CEOC operations for all lead CEOC staff, the actions have not been used enough to become familiar to most OIC's and Branch Coordinators.

II-D:

Some information was sent to staff members regular office e-mails, which were not valid since department staff were at the CEOC and not in their offices to read the messages.

II-E:

Consistent change-of-shift briefings did not happen for all staff, sections and branches.

II-F:

OIC's need to actively take the lead in their Sections, introduce themselves to their Branches at the beginning of each shift, and relay information and provide direction to their Branches on a regular basis.

II-G:
Overall communications needs to be improved in the CEOC; including basic notifications, EMIS and other CEOC systems. Emergency management applications should be used on a more regular basis so people become familiar with them.

II-H:
No initial first "incident" was reported in EMIS. Did not allow future incidents to link to something.

II-I:
Some press releases contained incorrect information when they were released.

II-J:
Some Board Reports contained incorrect information when they were sent out of the CEOC.

II-K:
Press releases, proclamations, and declarations were not readily accessible in an electronic format.

II-L:
There was no Safety Officer designated at the CEOC during the activation.

II-M:
Although it appeared in the CEOC that mass care activities were being executed appropriately, feedback from emergency managers in the field show an apparent insufficient mass care response was mounted, especially in Malibu.

III. Action Plans

III-A:
Action Plan objectives were not always clear and measurable.

III-B:
Branch personnel were often unsure exactly when Branch Reports were due to the Plans/Intel Section.

III-C:
Action Plans should be available electronically in a centralized location.

IV.   Resource Ordering/Tracking

IV-A:
It seems that CEOC staff need more resource request training. LASD requested 5,000 paper masks from Medical Health Branch then changed the order to 10,000 without utilizing appropriate updates.

IV-B:
The system of ordering resources though the CEOC needs to be reinforced at all levels.

IV-C:
Requests of purchases through the CEOC must be routed to Logistics Section via the Operations Section, FEMA will not reimburse for purchased goods without a valid reason. So far HSAC is only working with donated goods, but Logistics needs to make sure the cost will be covered.

V.   Facility Issues:

V-A:
There was an apparent need for a greater variety of food, including vegetarian options, in the CEOC meals.

V-B:
The late CEOC activation notification did not permit ISD to plan ahead for providing initial meals.

V-C:
There were apparent double orders of meals during some CEOC shifts.

V-D:
County Police guard(s) at the front gate need to be reminded about available food in the future.

V-E:
No voicemail was available for CEOC staff on CEOC phones.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

Recommendations Per Challenge Number:

I.   Notifications:

I-A:
OEM should automatically activate a redundant notification system, whenever initial notifications about a CEOC activation go out. The OEM Assistant Administrator instructed OEM staff on 11/13/07 to adjust the CEOC's mass notification system ensure that all relevant personnel (including DHS) are included in all future call outs.

I-A and V-B:
The CIO Mass notification project is also in development and will address many mass notification issues.

I-B and V-B:
Train all OEM staff how to change the CEOC Status on the EMIS "splash page".

I-C:
All OEM Duty Officers were reminded on 11/13/07 to use the existing OEM Duty Officer Situation Report template when sending out initial reports. This template includes fields for CEOC Activation status, and has been placed on all OEM staff computers as well as the OEM Duty Officer laptop computer.

I-D:
All OEM staff with CEOC responsibilities were trained to use the Dialogic mass notification system on 11/15/07. This information will be added to the OEM Duty Officer Manual and the CEOC Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's).

I-E:
All Disaster Management Area Coordinators (DMAC's) and city Emergency Services Coordinators (ESC's) should be referred to the Sheriff's Disaster Communications Service (DCS) to ensure they have amateur radio communications between themselves and the CEOC.

I-E:
A DMAC from an unaffected area should be assigned to the CEOC to act as a troubleshooter for all city-related issues, including communications.

I-E:
OEM should add a CWIRS notification protocol to the CEOC Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's).

I-E:
OEM is already in the process of providing all DMAC's and City ESC's with CWIRS radios to use as a redundant communications system during times of emergency.

I-E:
To promote easier scene access, CEOC Operations Section, Public Safety (Law) Branch personnel should coordinate with other CEOC sections and branches, including non-county liaisons and DMAC's, to assure emergency scene access for all authorized personnel. Authorized field personnel should report any problem accessing an emergency scene to their DOC and/or the CEOC immediately so they can mitigate the problem.

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II.   General Coordination in the CEOC:

II-A:
LASD should coordinate with OEM on providing additional and on-going training to all LASD personnel who have CEOC assignments, particularly personnel assigned as Section OIC's.

II-B, II-E, and II-F:
Future OIC training should focus on information sharing from the Section OIC's to their Branch Coordinators, including change-of-shift briefings. Training should also include information on the OIC's lead management role for their respective sections.

II-B:
OIC checklists were placed in OIC's CEOC vests on 11/13/07, so OIC's would have this information readily available during an activation.

II-C:
Ensure that any new emergency management software package for the CEOC is able to be used on a regular basis, not just for emergency activations only.

II-D:
All e-mails should go to the internal CEOC e-mail addresses provided, not individual users work accounts. Ensure that any new emergency management software package for the CEOC has a simple to use e-mail component to eliminate work-arounds being used in the CEOC currently.

II-G:
Take steps to improve overall communications in the CEOC. Such as; moving forward to acquire new emergency management software application which includes internal e-mail, notifications, and can be used during non-emergency periods so staff can become familiar with it prior to an emergency.

II-G:
EMIS monthly tests were reinstated on 11/6/07 to help familiarize users with the current system.

II-H:
Training for OEM Duty Officers should include initial EMIS event protocols, such as entering initial incidents in EMIS for an event so other users can enter information based on a common incident(s). They should also be trained to send a EMIS message confirming activation of the CEOC.

II-I:
CEOC PIO training needs to include a section on having CEOC branches review any press release information that pertains to their field of expertise. For example, DPW should review any press release that deals with road, bridge, etc. damage in unincorporated areas of the County.

II-I:
There needs to be a system in place to address media misinformation and correct it. Future press releases should also include corrections to address misinformation or rumors.

II-I:
Add a process regarding correcting misinformation to the Emergency Public Information (EPI) plan.

II-J:
Board Report should be reviewed by all pertinent County Departments and their CEOC Branch Coordinators/representatives before it is sent out.

II-J:
Department portion of Board Report should come from departments directly, and supplemented by the SITREP not the other way around.

II-J:
All oral reports from OIC's, Branch Coordinators and other CEOC staff inputted into the SITREP and Board Reports should be verified in written form before the final SITREP is released.

II-J:
Ensure that there is a solid deadline to submit department information for inclusion into the Board Report.

II-J:
Department Emergency Coordinators (DEC's) or their designees should be used to confirm department information for all Board Reports, and all information should be submitted to the Finance/Admin/Recovery Section by a solid, established deadline.

II-K:
Post SITREPs, local emergency proclamations and declarations on a County web site with a security feature for easy access during an event. Also, add a protocol to the CEOC SOPs for FAR staff to distribute copies of all proclamations to all CEOC staff.

II-L:
Assign a Safety Officer to the CEOC during future activations, preferably from County Risk Management. This should be part of Operational Area (OA) Emergency Response Plan (ERP), if it is not in there already.

II-M:
It is recommended that DPSS follow up on this issue with its mass care partner agencies as soon as possible.

III.   Action Plans:

III-A:
OIC training needs to include guidance on developing quality Action Plan objectives that reflect the capabilities of the Branches.

III-B:
OIC's need to inform their Branches in advance of when items such as Branch reports are due.

III-C:
Future CEOC staff training and exercises should include education on the use of the CEOC Shared Document electronic files. These files contain folders for Action Plans and other reports used in CEOC activations.

IV.   Resource Ordering/Tracking:

IV-A and IV-B:
Future CEOC staff training needs to focus on resource ordering and tracking. Also, any new emergency management software brought to the CEOC should include a resource ordering and tracking application.

IV-C:
Logistics (ISD) is using HSAC as an Emergency Vendor. HSAC's database should be added to ISD's. HSAC vendors can be used for County Departments. A County emergency proclamation allows the County more flexibility with regular procedures when necessary.

V.   Facility Issues:

V-A
Ensure that Logistics Section provides more variety and options for specific dietary needs for future long-term CEOC operations.

V-B:
Initial notification of CEOC activation was addressed in recommendations/corrective actions I-A through I-D.

V-C:
Logistics Section Procurement Branch Coordinator or designee needs to be the sole Point of Contact (POC) in the future in order to avoid double and incorrect food orders.

V-D:
Add to Logistics food distribution protocols to deliver food to the County Police officer(s) on-duty at the front driveway gate.

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V-E:
OEM Administrator is working to move OEM staff out of workrooms, so responding staff can use all workroom equipment, including voicemail.